educationanddiscipline_BertrandRussell_中文翻译

教育与规纪

REMARK：这篇文章再说教育与规矩，但是其中体现的中心思想（爱是上上计）才是需要借鉴的内容。

任何严肃的教育理论必须由两部分组成：生活目标的概念以及心理动力学的知识，如精神变化的规则。在生活目标上持不同态度的人不可能希望在教育上达成一致。纵观西方文明，教育机构受制于两种伦理观念：基督教和民主主义。一旦加以认真考虑，这两种观念就互相不相容，正如德国明显表现出来的那样。我认为，在其相异之处，基督教更可取，而在其相通之处，两者都是错的。我所代之为教育目的的是文明，这一术语，就我所指，含有部分地属于个体、部分地属于社会的定义。在个体方面，它含智力和道德品质：智力品质指某种最低限度的一般知识、自身的职业技能，以及事实论说的习惯；道德品质指公正、仁慈和基本的自制能力。我要加上一种品质，既木属道德，也不属智力，但也许是生理学上的：热情与生活的乐趣。在社会中，文明要求尊重法律、人与人之间的公正。不以卷入持久地伤害人类共一部分为目的以及对于目的的手段之智力上的适应。

假如这些成为教育的目的，问题就在于心理科学思考如何才能实现这些目的，特别是何种程度的自由才有可能证明是最有效的。

关于教育中的自由问题，目前主要有三种思想派别，其差异部分在于目的，部分在于心理学理论。有些人说，尽管孩子们可能怎样顽皮，他们应该是完全自由的；也有些人说，不管孩子们是如何听话，他们应该完全服从管教；另有些人说，孩子们应该是自由的，而有了自由，他们还应该始终好好听话。这最后的一部分人比应有的还大得多；像成年人那样，孩子们假如是完全自由的，他们不会是尽善尽美的。自由确保道德完善的信念是卢梭主义的残余，并不适用于对动物和孩子的研究。持有这一信念的人认为，教育不应有任何绝对的目的，而应仅仅提供一种适合自发性发展的环境。我不能赞同这一派别，在我看来，它过分个人主义了，过分地漠视知识的重要性。我们生活在需要合作的社会中，期望着自发的冲动能产生所有必要的合作有点乌托邦气息。在有限的区域里生存着大量的人口，这只有归因于科学技术才是可能的；因此，教育必须传递这些基本的又必不可少的思想。那些允许充分自由的教育者是这样一些人：他们把自己的成功寄托在某种程度的仁慈。自制以及所有冲动无所羁绊的地方几乎不能萌发的熟练智力；因此，如果他们的方法不加以调整的话，他们的长处就不能长存。从社会的立场看，教育必须是某种比单纯的成长机会更加积极的东西。当然，它必须提供这种机会，但它也必须一种为儿童的精神和道德素质，这种素质不能完全由他们自行获得。

赞成教育中应有很大程度自由的观点并不是来自人的自然慈善，而是来自权势对承受者和施行者的影响。那些屈服于权势的人变得唯唯暗暗，要么反叛木羁，两种态度均有缺陷。

驯服者在这思想和行动上都失去了开创精神；而且，由受挫的情绪生发的怒气倾向于在欺凌弱小者中寻找发泄的出口。这就是为什么暴君体制是自身延续着的：一个人从他父亲那里所受罪由他强加于自己的儿子；让他记忆犹新的中学里所受的耻辱，在他成为帝国元首时被传到了“国人”身上。这样，一种过分强调权力的教育使学生变为可怕的暴君，在言行上都无力主张和容忍创新。对教育者产生的影响更是糟糕：他们倾向成为施虐狂式的训纪者，乐于引发恐惧，别无他

求。由于这些人是知识的代表，学生所获得的便是知识的恐惧，这在英国的上层社会中被认为人类本性的一部分，但确实是权势教育颇有理由憎恨的一部分。

另一方面，尽管反叛可能是必要的，但其存在难以成理。而且，有许多反叛方式，而只有极小部分是明智的。伽利略是一位反叛者且又是明智的；平面地球理论的信奉者同样是反叛者，但是愚蠢的。认为反对权势在本质上是优点，不从习俗的观念必然正确，这种倾向是很危险的：砸坏灯杆或否认莎士比亚的诗人地位，根本达不到什么有用的目的。然而这种过分的反叛经常是过多的权势对富有朝气的学生压制的结果。一旦反叛者为教育者，他们时常鼓励学生蔑视权势，而与此同时他们又力图为学生们创造一个良好的环境，尽管这两个目的难以相容。

我们所需要的，既不是驯服，也不是反叛，而是良善的性情以及对人对新思想的友好态度。这些品质部分地归于自然原因，这方面旧式的教育者注意得大少；但更多地归因于举足轻重的冲动受到挫折后，困顿的感觉需求的自由。假如年轻人要成为友善的的成人，在多数情况下，有必要让他们感到自己的环境是友善的。这就要求对孩子的重要欲望要有同情心，而不只是有利用他为某种抽象的目的奋斗的企图，如为了上帝的荣耀和祖国的伟大。在教育中，应该努力使学生感到值得去了解所教的东西--至少在这些知识是真实的情况下。一旦学生自觉合作，其学习就能事半功倍。所有这些理由有力地阐明了高度自由的意义。

然而，这一观点很容易走过场。儿童在避免奴性时沾上贵族的恶习，这不是我们愿意看到的。考虑别人，不仅是在大事上，而且在日常生活的小事中，是文明的一个基本因素，没有它，社会生活将不堪忍受。我指的不只是那些礼貌形式，如说“请”和“谢谢”；正统的言行举止在野蛮人中发展得最充分，但随着文化的每一次前进就慢慢消失了。我是指自愿参加一定要的必要工作，在一些免于麻烦的小事之处要自制克己。给孩子一种全能的意识，或者一种成人之存在只是服务于年轻人的快乐的信念，都不是人们所乐于见到的。那些赞成存在懒散之客的人，如果把自己的孩子培养成毫无工作意识、没有孜孜追求的习惯，他们都将自食其果。

另外，自由的拥护者过分轻视了其危害性。在没有成人介入的儿童团体中，较强者为暴力者，并且很可能比成人暴君更为残忍。假如两个二三岁的孩子在一起自己玩耍，几次打架之后他们就发现谁是胜者，而另一个孩子就成了奴隶。在孩子较多的地方，有一二个人获得完全的支配权，其他人的自由比成人出面干涉保护弱小者时他们拥有的要更少。对于大多数孩子来说，为别人着想并不是自发的，而必须给予教养，而除了运用权力，它是很难教会的。这也许就是反对成人退出教育的最重要观点。

我认为教育者还没有解决把自由的合适形式与必要的道德训练结合在一起的问题。必须承认，在孩子上学前，正当的解决方法常常给家长弄糟了。正如心理分析学家从他们临床实践中得出的结论，苦苦众生都是疯人，以致现代学校里的领导们在同家长们所娇宠的学生的接触中，都倾向论断说所有的儿童都是“费力的”，而所有的家长则愚蠢至极。那些因家长的暴君式教育而被逼得野蛮的儿童（它经常带有一种焦虑的情绪），或多或少需要一段完全自由的时间，才能去毫无猜疑地看待成人。但是，那些在家里得到悉心照料的儿童在细小之处也能忍受指使，只要他们感到是在自己认为是重要的方式中得到帮助。那些喜爱孩子、不因陪伴他们而陷入一种精力耗竭状态的成人，能够在规约上获得巨大的成功，而不使他们的学生中止以友善的感情对待他们。

我认为现代教育家倾向于过分重视不干预儿童生活这种消极的品性，而过分轻视乐于陪伴他们的积极作用。如果你以许多人喜欢马和狗的方式去对待孩子．他们就会很容易对你的建议作出反应，并且接受禁令，也许带有和善的抱怨，但绝无怨恨。把儿童看作是有价值的社会发展的领导，或--毫无差别地--作为权力冲动的出口，包含着这些态度的溺爱形式是没有用处的。如果你认为孩子将为你的党派获得一票或为国王。祖国指定的思想而对他产生的兴趣，对于这种态度，没有一个孩子会感激的。令人愉悦的兴趣，蕴含在孩子面前自发的快乐之中，不带任何隐秘的目的。具有这种品质的教师将很少需要去干涉儿童的自由，但一旦需要，也有能力去做，却不导致心理上的损害。

不幸的是，工作繁重的老师对儿童要保持一种本能的喜欢是完全不可能的；他们对儿童的感觉肯定无异于出名的糕点师的徒弟对待蛋糕那样。我认为教育不应是一个人的全部职业：教育工作者一天至多工作两小时，其余时间应该离开儿童。青年人的社会是令人疲乏的，尤其当没有严格约束的时候。疲乏最终产生颁燥，而以某种方式表现出来，把老师教过的而让他们去相信的理论放在一旁。必要的友善是不能单靠自制来维持的。但只要它存在，就不必事先为如何处理“淘气的”儿童去制定各种纪律，因为冲动可能导向正当的决定，而假如儿童感到你喜欢他，几乎所有的决定就是正确的了。无论怎样明智，没有一种规约可以成为感情和策略的替代物。

附：原文

(Education and Discipline –Bertrand Russell)

Education And Discipline

Any serious educational theory must consist of two parts: a conception of the ends

of life, and a science of psychological dynamics, i.e. of the laws of mental change.

Two men who differ as to the ends of life cannot hope to agree about education.

The educational machine, throughout Western civilization, is dominated by two

ethical theories: that of Christianity, and that of nationalism. These two, when

taken seriously, are incompatible, as is becoming evident in Germany. For my

part, I hold that, where they differ, Christianity is preferable, but where they agree,

both are mistaken. The conception which I should substitute as the purpose of

education is civilization, a term which, as I mean it, has a definition which is

partly individual, partly social. It consists, in the individual, of both intellectual

and moral qualities: intellectually, a certain minimum of general knowledge,

technical skill in one's own profession, and a habit of forming opinions on

evidence; morally, of impartiality, kindliness, and a modicum of self-control. I

should add a quality which is neither moral nor intellectual, but perhaps

physiological: zest and joy of life. In communities, civilization demands respect for

law, justice as between man and man, purposes not involving permanent injury to

any section of the human race, and intelligent adaptation of means to ends. If

these are to be the purpose of education, it is a question for the science of

psychology to consider what can be done towards realizing them, and, in

particular, what degree of freedom is likely to prove most effective.

On the question of freedom in education there are at present three main schools of

thought, deriving partly from differences as to ends and partly from differences in

psychological theory. There are those who say that children should be completely

free, however bad they may be; there are those who say they should be completely

subject to authority, however good they may be; and there are those who say they

should be free, but in spite of freedom they should be always good. This last party

is larger than it has any logical right to be; children, like adults, will not all be

virtuous if they are all free. The belief that liberty will ensure moral perfection is a

relic of Rousseauism, and would not survive a study of animals and babies. Those

who hold this belief think that education should have no positive purpose, but

should merely offer an environment suitable for spontaneous development. I

cannot agree with this school, which seems to me too individualistic, and unduly

indifferent to the importance of knowledge. We live in communities which require

co-operation, and it would be utopian to expect all the necessary co-operation to

result from spontaneous impulse. The existence of a large population on a limited

area is only possible owing to science and technique; education must, therefore,

hand on the necessary minimum of these. The educators who allow most freedom

are men whose success depends upon a degree of benevolence, self-control, and

trained intelligence which can hardly be generated where every impulse is left

unchecked; their merits, therefore, are not likely to be perpetuated if their

methods are undiluted. Education, viewed from a social standpoint, must be

something more positive than a mere opportunity for growth. It must, of course,

provide this, but it must also provide a mental and moral equipment which

children cannot acquire entirely for themselves.

The arguments in favor of a great degree of freedom in education are derived not

from man's natural goodness, but from the effects of authority, both on those who

suffer it and on those who exercise it. Those who are subject to authority become

either submissive or rebellious, and each attitude has its drawbacks.

The submissive lose initiative, both in thought and action; moreover, the

anger generated by the feeling of being thwarted tends to find an outlet in bullying

those who are weaker. That is why tyrannical institutions are self-perpetuating:

what a man has suffered from his father he inflicts upon his son, and the

humiliations which he remembers having endured at his public school he passes

on to Ònatives" when he becomes an empire-builder. Thus an unduly

authoritative education turns the pupils into timid tyrants, incapable of either

claiming or tolerating originality in word or deed. The effect upon the educators is

even worse: they tend to become sadistic disciplinarians, glad to inspire terror,

and content to inspire nothing else. As these men represent knowledge, the pupils

acquire a horror of knowledge, which, among the English upper-class, is

supposed to be part of human nature, but is really part of the well-grounded

hatred of the authoritarian pedagogue.

Rebels, on the other hand,, though they may be necessary, can hardly be just

to what exists. Moreover, there are many ways of rebelling, and only a small

minority of these are wise. Galileo was a rebel and was wise; believers in the

flat-earth theory are equally rebels, but are foolish. There is a great danger in the

tendency to suppose that opposition to authority is essentially meritorious and

that unconventional opinions are bound to be correct: no useful purpose is served

by smashing lamp-posts or maintaining Shakespeare to be no poet. Yet this

excessive rebelliousness is often the effect that too much authority has on spirited

pupils. And when rebels become educators, they sometimes encourage defiance in

their pupils, for whom at the same time they are trying to produce a perfect

environment, although these two aims are scarcely compatible.

What is wanted is neither submissiveness nor rebellion, but good nature, and

general friendliness both to people and to new ideas. These qualities are due in

part to physical causes, to which old-fashioned educators paid too little attention;

but they are due still more to freedom from the feeling of baffled impotence which

arises when vital impulses are thwarted. If the young are to grow into friendly

adults, it is necessary, in most cases, that they should feel their environment

friendly. This requires that there should be a certain sympathy with the child's

important desires, and not merely an attempt to use him for some abstract end

such as the glory of God or the greatness of one's country. And, in teaching, every

attempt should be made to cause the pupil to feel that it is worth his while to know

what is being taught-at least when this is true. When the pupil co-operates

willingly, he learns twice as fast and with half the fatigue. All these are valid

reasons for a very great degree of freedom.

It is easy, however, to carry the argument too far. It is not desirable that children,

in avoiding the vices of the slave, should acquire those of the aristocrat.

Consideration for others, not only in great matters, but also in little everyday

things, is an essential element in civilization, without which social life would be

intolerable. I am not thinking of mere forms of politeness, such as saying "please"

and "thank you": formal manners are most fully developed among barbarians, and

diminish with every advance in culture. I am thinking rather of willingness to take

a fair share of necessary work, to be obliging in small ways that save trouble on

the balance. Sanity itself is a form of politeness and it is not desirable to give a

child a sense of omnipotence, or a belief that adults exist only to minister to the

pleasures of the young. And those who disapprove of the existence of the idle rich

are hardly consistent if they bring up their children without any sense that work

is necessary, and without the habits that make continuous application possible.

There is another consideration to which some advocates of freedom attach too

little importance. In a community of children which is left without adult

interference there is a tyranny of the stronger, which is likely to be far more brutal

than most adult tyranny. If two children of two or three years old are left to play

together, they will, after a few fights, discover which is bound to be the victor, and

the other will then become a slave. Where the number of children is larger, one or

two acquire complete mastery, and the others have far less liberty than they

would have if the adults interfered to protect the weaker and less pugnacious.

Consideration for others does not, with most children, arise spontaneously, but

has to be taught, and can hardly be taught except by the exercise of authority.

This is perhaps the most important argument against the abdication of the adults.

I do not think that educators have yet solved the problem of combining the

desirable forms of freedom with the necessary minimum of moral training. The

right solution, it must be admitted, is often made impossible by parents before the

child is brought to an enlightened school. just as psychoanalysts, from their

clinical experience, conclude that we are all mad, so the authorities in modern

schools, from their contact with pupils whose parents have made them

unmanageable, are disposed to conclude that all children are "difficult" and all

parents utterly foolish. Children who have been driven wild by parental tyranny

(which often takes the form of solicitous affection) may require a longer or shorter

period of complete liberty before they can view any adult without suspicion. But

children who have been sensibly handled at home can bear to be checked in minor

ways, so long as they feel that they are being helped in the ways that they

themselves regard as important. Adults who like children, and are not reduced to

a condition of nervous exhaustion by their company, can achieve a great deal in

the way of discipline without ceasing to be regarded with friendly feelings by their

pupils.

I think modern educational theorists are inclined to attach too much importance

to the negative virtue of not interfering with children, and too little to the positive

merit of enjoying their company. If you have the sort of liking for children that

many people have for horses or dogs, they will be apt to respond to your

suggestions, and to accept prohibitions, perhaps with some good-humoured

grumbling, but without resentment. It is no use to have the sort of liking that

consists in regarding them as a field for valuable social endeavour, or what

amounts to the same thingÑas an outlet for power-impulses. No child will be

grateful for an interest in him that springs from the thought that he will have a

vote to be secured for your party or a body to be sacrificed to king and country.

The desirable sort of interest is that which consists in spontaneous pleasure in

the presence of children, without any ulterior purpose. Teachers who have this

quality will seldom need to interfere with children's freedom, but will be able to do

so, when necessary, without causing psychological damage.

Unfortunately, it is utterly impossible for over-worked teachers to preserve an

instinctive liking for children; they are bound to come to feel towards them as the

proverbial confectioner's apprentice does towards macaroons. I do not think that

education ought to be anyone's whole profession: it should be undertaken for at

most two hours a day by people whose remaining hours are spent away from

children. The society of the young is fatiguing, especially when strict discipline is

avoided. Fatigue, in the end, produces irritation, which is likely to express itself

somehow, whatever theories the harassed teacher may have taught himself or

herself to believe. The necessary friendliness cannot be preserved by self-control

alone. But where it exists, it should be unnecessary to have rules in advance as to

how "naughty" children are to be treated, since impulse is likely to lead to the right

decision, and almost any decision will be right if the child feels that you like him.

No rules, however wise, are a substitute for affection and tact.