《联合国海洋法公约》框架内、外 (在某些情况下)国际海洋法的新进展

《联合国海洋法公约》框架内、外（在某些情况下）

国际海洋法的新进展

1

《联合国海洋法公约》框架内、外

（在某些情况下）国际海洋法的新进展

Tullio Scovazzi

*

一、 一再重复的观点

联合国大会每年通过主题为“海洋和海洋法”的决议均强调，《联合国海洋法

公约》（UNCLOS）是开展各种海洋活动必须遵循的法律框架。例如，最近一项

决议重申UNCLOS“为海洋中开展的所有活动制定了法律框架，作为国家、区

域和全球在海洋领域采取行动与合作的基础，具有战略重要性，需要保持其完整

性……”。

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虽然各国和学者们经常重申类似的观点，但UNCLOS仍有可能被质疑其能

否完全地符合事实。不过UNCLOS无疑是国际法编纂进程的一个基石，其被描

述为一部“海洋宪章”“一项国际社会的重大成就”“第一个几乎涉及海洋利用和

海洋资源所有方面的综合条约”，以及一个“成功地顾及到所有国家利益冲突”的

（及未提及的其他）优点是公认的。然而，上述决议

文书。

2

UNCLOS拥有以上的

提出的所有海洋活动都必须限定在《联合国海洋法公约》范围内的观点，却是远不

能令人信服的。

第一，UNCLOS本身存在一些明显的空白。参与谈判的国家不愿意或没有

能力处理和解决几个棘手的问题，最后成为UNCLOS中被故意留下的模糊空间。

这种情况下，可以通过习惯国际法的规定（通过习惯国际法进行规制）来填补空白。

UNCLOS条款中使用的一些通用术语也可能不够精准。对UNCLOS相关条款的

不同理解在原则上是可以接受的，各国的实践可能成为条约解释中更为重要的一

* Tullio Scovazzi，意大利米兰比科大学法学院国际法学教授。电子邮箱：tullio.

******************。本文是系作者参加第二届中欧国际海洋法研讨会（厦门）的报告

论文，作者诚挚感谢厦门大学南海研究院的邀请以及与会专家所提反馈意见。

©THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW

1 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 23 December 2016: Oceans and the law of

the sea, A/RES/71/257.

2

Tommy T. B. Koh, A Constitution for the Oceans, in U.N., The Law of the Sea - Official

Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index, New

York, 1983, p. xxiii.

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种方法（通过UNCLOS的条约解释进行规制）。

第二，更明显的是，虽然UNCLOS为许多事项提供了一个坚实的法律制度，

但因此认为UNCLOS是海洋法领域法律规制的终极状态也是不切实际的，该领

域可能会出现意想不到的问题，可能会开展需要特定规则的新活动，其中可能会

包括一些偏离UNCLOS所规定的活动。对原UNCLOS制度的增补和修改已通

过两个所谓的《执行协议》并被纳入UNCLOS公约本身（通过UNCLOS的整合

进行规制）。另外一种情况是UNCLOS不足以满足实际需求（这种情况很少发生，

但也不能完全排除）时，便需要起草一项国际通行的新文书，以避免需要通过其他

文书规制的海法领域无章可循的风险。

二、通过习惯国际法进行规制

UNCLOS最明显的空白位于关于专属经济区划界的第74条和与之相似的关

于大陆架划界的第83条，UNCLOS第74条：

应在国际法院规约第

1

.海岸相向或相邻的国家间专属经济区的界限，

三十八条所指国际法的基础上以协议划定，以便得到公平解决。

应诉诸第十五部分所规

2

.有关国家如在合理期间内未能达成任何协议，

定的程序。

有关各国应基于谅解和合作精神，尽

3

.在达成第

1

款规定的协议以前，

一切努力作出实际性的临时安排，并在此过渡期间内，不危害或阻碍最后协

议的达成。这种安排应不妨害最后界限的划定。

关于划定专属经济区界限的问

4

.如果有关国家间存在现行有效的协定，

题，应按照该协定的规定加以决定。

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第74条和第83条，其给人的印象是，尽管内容详尽但没有规定任何实质性

的制度。通过诉诸程序手段，它们规避了解决利害攸关的主要问题。除了指出有

关国家为找到解决办法而必须诉诸的程序之外，第74条和第83条并没有对划界

问题作太多说明。特别是，第1款没有具体说明有关国家未就划界达成协定时可

适用的实质性规则是什么。援引《国际法院规约》第38条并未就如何解决问题的

3 　《联合国海洋法公约》第83条几乎复制了第74条，唯一的变化是用“大陆架”取代了

“专属经济区”。

《联合国海洋法公约》框架内、外（在某些情况下）

国际海洋法的新进展

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4

实质（即如何在地图上画线），提供任何明确的指导。指出“公平解决”的目标似

乎是多余的，因为任何由各方自由谈判和缔结的协定，自然都体现了公平解决。

第4款规定，如果有关国家间存在现行有效的协定，则该协定适用，这让人想起帕

利斯先生（Monsieur de La Palice）的故事一样，是显而易见。第74条和第83条

可以理解为一种有关国家为缔结一项关于划界的协定并诚实行事的一般义务的确

认，但无法从中推断出任何关于如何解决问题的进一步指导。

第74条和第83条内容的模糊是有实际原因的。在UNCLOS制定的谈判阶

段，涉及海洋划界等敏感问题的国家强烈反对可能对其海岸相向或相邻的国家有

利的明确规则。此外，面临多样化的划界问题（视海岸线的特点和不同的邻国的

而定）的国家，更喜欢采用一种模糊的措词，使它们有足够的灵活性在不同领域玩

不同的把戏。通过在UNCLOS的文本中作出明确的规定来打破这种僵局是极其

困难的。这便是UNCLOS起草人对非常有争议的划界问题选择模糊化处理原因。

若不想打开潘多拉魔盒，就必须如此，否则可能会阻碍UNCLOS的通过或普遍接

受。

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现今，UNCLOS留下的规范空白正通过自1969年

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以来由国际法院或仲裁

法庭作出的一系列国际裁决来填补。这一系列引人注目的国际裁决使用了一些解

决问题的“方法”（如等距离原则、比例原则、减少岛屿的影响、移动等距线、划出

通道），根据每个具体案件的相关情况，法院裁定哪些方法适用于划定沿海海域，

以实现公平解决。这些方法今天已经成为习惯国际法规则。

UNCLOS的另一个空白来自第10条第6款。该款指出，UNCLOS关于海

湾的规定不适用于所谓的“历史性”海湾。这一例外造成了一个法律空白，因为

UNCLOS没有具体说明什么是“历史性”海湾，以及适用于这些海湾的其他规则

有哪些。在国际实践和理论著作中，常给“历史性海湾”提出一些法律要素作为有

无“历史”的条件，即国家权力的行使、这种权利行使的长期存在并持续、其他国

4　 《国际法院规约》第38条具体规定了国际法院必须适用的规则类型：一、法院对于陈

诉各项争端，应依国际法裁判之，裁判时应适用：（子）不论普通或特别国际协约，确

立诉讼当事国明白承认之规条者；（丑）国际习惯，作为通例之证明而经接受为法律

者；（寅）一般法律原则为文明各国所承认者；（卯）在第五十九条规定之下，司法判

例及各国权威最高之公法学家学说，作为确定法律原则之补助资料者。二、前项规定

不妨碍法院经当事国同意本“公允及善良”原则裁判案件之权。　

5　 Eritrea/Yemen - Sovereignty and Maritime Delimitation in the Red Sea, PCA-CPA,

Judgement, para. 116 (1999). UNCLOS的僵局如此明显，以至于仲裁法庭于1999年12

月17日裁决厄立特里亚-也门仲裁（第二阶段：海洋划界）案时作出如下评论："无

论如何，对条款（UNCLOS第七十四条和第八十三条）的解释必须留有意见分歧的余

地。联合国海洋法第三次会议在最后一刻努力就一个非常有争议的问题达成协定，其

目的是有意识地尽量少做裁决。不过，很明显，这两条都设想了一个公平的结果”（裁

决第116段）。

6　 1969年2月20日，国际法院在北海大陆架案（德意志联邦共和国诉丹麦、德意志联

邦共和国诉荷兰案）中首次作出了相关判决。

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家的承认以及沿海国存在重大利益（不太常见）。但是，有关国家对具体案件中是

否存在这种条件提出了许多不同的看法。

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三、 通过UNCLOS的条约解释进行规制

UNCLOS第7条有关“直线基线”的情况表明，UNCLOS条款如果从字面

上理解，可能会有不同的含义，有时各国对UNCLOS条款的理解也会出现过于宽

泛、甚至不同的解释。

“基线”一词是指划分领海和其他海洋区域的线。直线基线制度是一种例外，

根据这种规则，领海的正常基线是沿岸的低潮线。而如果出现某些情况，可以连

接陆地上适当的点将直线基线绘制到海洋中。第7条相关各款内容如下：

或者紧接海岸有一系列岛屿，测算领海宽

1.

在海岸线极为曲折的地方，

度的基线的划定可采用连接各适当点的直线基线法。

而且

3.

直线基线的划定不应在任何明显的程度上偏离海岸的一般方向，

基线内的海域必须充分接近陆地领土，使其受内水制度的规范。

注意，这两款规定中可能会有一些冗杂之处，因为一个曲折的海岸必然地形

破碎，反之亦然。但背后的观念很清晰，即不可以通过激进的方法改变、重塑特定

国家海岸的形状，唯一能做的是运用几何方法修正明显不规则的海岸线。简化而

不改变：这是直线基线作为例外的补充途径的目的。

然而，对第7条的解读留下了一种不确定感，因为该条款的措辞没有包含足

够的几何精度。在这方面可能会产生一些问题，例如一条海岸线何时可以被认为

是极为曲折的？凹入程度和曲口宽度的比例是多少？一系列岛屿离海岸多远才算

紧接海岸？这个距离应该在海岸到最近的岛屿还是到最外部的岛屿之间距离？岛

屿本身之间的距离应该是多少，才能构成一个系列？位于垂直于海岸方向而非平

行于海岸方向的一系列岛屿是否符合直线基线的条件？如何才能确定直线基线的

划定是否明显偏离海岸的一般方向？海岸的一般方向本身是如何确定的？

8

在哪

些情况下，可以认为海洋区域充分接近陆地领土，在什么情况下又可以认为海域

与陆地领土充分接近？第7条都没有给出明确的答复。

如果UNCLOS为直线基线的单段规定了最大长度限制，所有问题都会得到

解决。但事实并非如此，尽管有人试图使其更加精确，但第7条的规定仍然较为

7 　《联合国海洋法公约》第298条第1款（a）项（1）目，对不同于海湾的海洋水域也可

以提出“历史性”的要求。

8　 很明显，所有这方面的相关结论很大程度上都受到所用地图比例尺的影响。

《联合国海洋法公约》框架内、外（在某些情况下）

国际海洋法的新进展

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模糊。推断最大长度限制可能会被认为是对条款解释的歪曲，应根据其灵活性对

该条款予以理解。

不考虑第7条，个别沿海国的立法中有其自身的实践。在这些实践中，这些

国家在确定海岸线直线基线制度时，依赖于相当有弹性的标准，这些海岸线虽然

不是直线的，但似乎也并非极为曲折或紧接海岸有一系列岛屿。尽管国际法院发

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但当今个别国家的实践似乎明确地指向了对《公约》第7条进行更加

出了警告，

宽泛地解释和适用，远远超出了其绝对的措辞。在大多数情况下，只有少数国家

或在划定海洋界限时可能会受到直线基线制度影响的邻国提出的抗议。这种宽泛

解释的趋势可能导致对第7条的新解读。

四、 通过

UNCLOS

的条文整合进行规范

（一）两项UNCLOS执行协定

迄今已通过的两项UNCLOS执行协定是通过UNCLOS自身的整合进行规

范的一个典型的例子。在这种情况下，对UNCLOS内涵的修改是通过“生理”方

式来进行的，这种方式并不会导致UNCLOS体系的逻辑破坏。

1994年，UNCLOS最具创新性部分中的几项规定得到了修改，即涉及国家

管辖范围以外的海底矿产资源的部分，这些资源适用人类共同继承财产制度。

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做出这些修改是为了能够使各国普遍加入《公约》，包括尚未成为《公约》缔约国

的发达国家。具体做法就是联合国大会在1994年8月17日通过了第48/263号

决议所附的《关于执行1982年12月10日〈联合国海洋法公约〉第十一部分的协定》。

实际上，在这里，“执行协定”这个在政治上审慎使用的称谓只不过是“修正”

一词的委婉说法，从法律角度来看，用“修正”会更正确。原则上，1994年《关于

执行〈联合国海洋法公约〉第十一部分的协定》的规定应作为单一文书一并解释

和应用”（《执行协定》第2条）。但是，如果1994年《执行协定》与UNCLOS第

十一部分之间有任何不一致之处，则以UNCLOS的规定为准。

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在渔业领域也出现了将一些额外规定“纳入”UNCLOS制度的趋势。《执行

1982年12月10日〈联合国海洋法公约〉有关养护和管理跨界鱼类种群和高度洄

9 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.

Bahrain), ICJ, Judgement, para. 212 (2001). 国际法院在2001年3月16日对卡塔尔和巴

林之间的海洋划界和领土问题作出裁决时指出，“直线基线法是确定基线的正常规则

的例外，只有在满足若干条件的情况下才能适用。这种方法必须有限制地适用”（判

决第212段)。

10　 见下文，第四节第二点。

11　 截至2020年11月，仍有18个UNCLOS的缔约国尚未成为《1994年执行协定》的缔

约国，这一备受关注的事实引发了几乎无法解决的条约法问题。

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游鱼类种群的规定的协定》 于1995年12月4日开放，以供签署。这项条约有一

个明显的缺陷，那就是标题长得令人难以接受，当然它也有很多优点，例如详细规

定了适用渔业的预防性做法（第6条和附件二），规定缔约方“须能够对悬挂本国

国旗的船只切实执行对这些船只负有的责任”方可准其用于公海捕鱼（第18条，

第2款）。最值得注意的是，它规定不愿意遵守养护和管理措施的国家不应该在

12

因此，

公海捕鱼，从而给传统的公海自由原则带来了一个明显而受欢迎的排他。

可以让那些只利用其他国家商定的自我约束措施却不接受由此造成的负担的“搭

便车”国家无法在公海捕鱼。所有这些发展都是对UNCLOS渔业制度的重要补充。

（二）有可能制定的第三项UNCLOS执行协定

2015年6月19日，联合国大会以协商一致方式通过了第69/292号决议，该

决议涉及根据UNCLOS制定一项关于养护和可持续利用国家管辖范围以外海洋

生物多样性的具有法律约束力的国际文书。于是，成立了一个筹备委员会，其任

务是就此类文书草案文本的内容向联合国大会提出实质性建议。谈判涉及四个主

要专题，即“海洋遗传资源，包括惠益分享问题”、“包括海洋保护区在内的划区

管理工具等措施”、“环境影响评估”和“能力建设和海洋技术转让”，旨在作为“一

揽子事项”，意思是说这些专题彼此不能分开。

2017年7月21日，筹备委员会建议联合国大会尽快决定召开政府间会议，

以审议其对拟纳入UNCLOS的具有国际法律约束力的文书案文内容的建议。出

席筹备委员会会议的大多数代表团在若干方面达成了共识，但对于其他内容还存

在意见分歧。

在主要专题中，海洋遗传资源问题带来了一些政治和法律方面的挑战，这可

能使其成为谈判中最困难的部分。关于未来制度的一些组成部分方面仍然存在分

歧，首先是关于该制度应该基于公海自由原则，还是基于人类共同继承财产原则，

这是该制度首先要做出的基本选择。

UNCLOS第136条宣布，国际海底区域（以下简称”区域“），即国家管辖范

围以外的海床、洋底和底土及其资源，为人类的共同继承财产。这是UNCLOS的

主要创新方面。人类共同继承财产制度的基本内容是禁止国家侵占、指定“区域”

只用于和平目的、为了全人类的利益来利用“区域”及其资源，并特别考虑发展中

国家的利益和需要，以及建立一个有权代表人类行使资源权利的国际组织。这些

12 《关于执行 1982 年 12 月 10 日〈联合国海洋法公约〉第十一部分的协定》第8条第3

款，一方面，对有关渔业真正感兴趣的所有国家都有权成为某一次区域或区域渔业管

理组织的成员或这种安排的参与方；第8条第4款，另一方面，只有属于这种组织的

成员或安排的参与方的国家，或同意适用这种组织或安排所订立的养护和管理措施的

国家，才可以捕捞适用这些措施的渔业资源。

《联合国海洋法公约》框架内、外（在某些情况下）

国际海洋法的新进展

7

内容都可以在《关于执行1982年12月10日〈联合国海洋法公约〉第十一部分的

及其资源是人类的共同继承财产（第136条）。任何国

协定》中找到。

13

“区域”

家都不得对“区域”的任何部分主张或对行使主权，任何国家或自然人或法人也不

得将“区域”的任何部分据为己有（第137条，第1款）。“区域”专门用于和平目

的（第141条）。“区域”资源的所有权利都属于全人类，一个国际组织——国际

海底管理局（以下简称“管理局”）有权代表全人类采取行动。“区域”内活动为全

人类的利益而进行，不论各国的地理位置如何，也不论是沿海国或内陆国，并特别

考虑到发展中国家的利益和需要（第140条，第1款）。管理局应作出规定并通

过适当机构，公平分配从“区域”活动中取得的财政及其他经济利益（第140条，

第2款）。

然而，“区域”的矿产资源的前景仍然不明朗，因为一些因素对其未来的商业

开发造成了负面影响。其中包括矿床的位置极深，采矿技术的研发成本高昂，以

及在当前的经济条件下，海底采矿与陆上采矿相比仍然没有竞争力。

与此同时，开发国家管辖范围以外的遗传资源已成为一项具有商业前景的活

动。尽管深海温度条件极端、完全黑暗和高压，但深海海底并不是沙漠。深海海

底是与一系列不同的典型特征相关的各种生命形式的栖息地，这些典型特征包括

热液喷口、冷水渗漏、海山或深水珊瑚礁。特别是，深海海底提供具有独特遗传特

征的生物群落生存的能力，包括在极端温度（嗜热菌和超嗜热菌）、高压（嗜压微

生物）和其他困难条件（嗜极微生物）下的生存能力。

到目前为止，只有少数国家和私营实体拥有到达深海海床并采集那里发现的

生物体样本所需的财政手段和尖端技术，以此在实验室中分离出样品中的遗传物

质，其结果可能是开发具有商业价值的产品并为其申请专利。

这类活动带来的法律问题是UNCLOS和1992年的《生物多样性公约》都没

有为国家管辖范围以外的海洋遗传资源规定任何具体的监管框架。

在这方面，一些国家，特别是一些发展中国家的立场是，UNCLOS关于人类

共同继承财产的原则也适用于海洋遗传资源，管理局的任务也应涵盖这类资源。

其他国家，特别是一些发达国家，则依赖公海自由原则，自由获取和不受限制地开

采遗传资源。

似乎这两种相互矛盾的观点都源于一再重复的观点，即UNCLOS是在海洋

空间进行的所有活动的法律框架。然而，UNCLOS无法创造奇迹去规范那些在

谈判期间尚无法预见的活动，因为当时人们对海洋生物基因的用途还知之甚少，

UNCLOS的任何条款中也均未提到“遗传资源”和“生物勘探”

14

这两个词。

13　 尽管《关于执行1982年12月10日〈联合国海洋法公约〉第十一部分的协定》修改了”

区域”的制度（见上文，第四节第一点），但人类共同继承财产原则仍然是《联合国海

洋法公约》的重要启示。

14　 这一活动目前被理解为寻找有商业价值的遗传资源。

8

中华海洋法学评论（

2020

年第

3

期）

事实上，UNCLOS将“区域”内的“活动”一词定义为“勘探和开发区域的资

源的一切活动”（第1条，第1款），而“区域”的“资源”这一术语被定义为“‘区

域’内在海床或海床及其下原来位置的一切固体、液体或气体矿物资源，其中包括

多金属结核”（第133条，a项）。这意味着，UNCLOS关于人类共同继承财产

的现行制度不包括“区域”的非矿物资源，矿产资源勘探和开采规则不能扩展到位

于区域内的其他资源。

然而，这并不妨碍各国将人类共同继承财产原则扩展到UNCLOS未涵盖的

新发现资源，如果这些国家愿意这样做的话。现今，“区域”制度的范围已经比它

乍看之下所认为的范围要广泛。根据UNCLOS，“区域”作为人类共同继承财产

的法律条件也影响到对活动的监管，尽管这些活动与采矿活动不同，但也位于这

一空间。“区域”制度包括与采矿活动或多或少直接相关的主题，如海洋科学研究

（见第143条，第1款），保护海洋环境（见第145条）和保护水下文化遗产（见

第149条）。就前两个主题而言，很难明确区分在海床上发生的事情和在上覆水

域发生的事情。

然而，将人类共同继承财产原则延伸到“区域”的非矿物资源将是合乎

UNCLOS精神的自然演化，UNCLOS是一项以联合国大会第2749（XXV）号

15

旨在“有助于实现公正公平的国际经济秩序，这种秩序将照

决议为基础的条约，

顾到全人类的利益和需要，特别是发展中国家的特殊利益和需要，不论其为沿海

国或内陆国”（UNCLOS序言）。虽然缺乏明确的遗传资源制度，但使所有国家

之间共享惠益的目标仍然可以视为UNCLOS精神中包含的一个基本目标。同样，

在遗传资源领域，适用以“先到先得”或“谋求资源的捕捞自由”为基础的海洋自

由原则会导致不公平的后果。所以，可以构想新的合作计划，包括关于获取和分

享惠益的规定，就是未来国家管辖范围以外的海洋遗传资源制度的基础。这也将

完全符合《生物多样性公约》第1条及其《关于获取遗传资源和公正及公平分享其

利用遗传资源所产生惠益的名古屋议定书》（名古屋，2010年）第10条规定的公

15　 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 24 October 1970: Declaration of Principles

Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of

National Jurisdiction, United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/2749(XXV).根据《关于

各国管辖范围以外海洋底床与下层土壤之原则宣言》，国家管辖范围以外的所有海底

资源都受人类共同继承财产制度管辖。该决议没有对矿产资源和非矿产资源进行区

分。

《联合国海洋法公约》框架内、外（在某些情况下）

国际海洋法的新进展

9

平公正分享利用遗传资源所产生的惠益的原则。

16

如果第三个执行协定得以通过并生效，这可能会大大改善海洋国际法，并建

立一种更加公平的海洋资源开发体系。鉴于正在讨论的许多问题非常有难度且错

综复杂，因而谈判需要有关国家本着克制的精神并努力发挥建设性的想象力。如

果在讨论的这一初步阶段，没有出现解决几个关键问题的最佳方式，也不足为奇。

对于即将举行的会议会产生的结果，时间自会说明。

五、通过其他文书进行规范

在UNCLOS制度中不完整或者说是明显令人不满的水下文化遗产方面，为

了避免那些可能导致不良后果的风险，已通过一项在与UNCLOS不同并具有普

遍性的文书。

UNCLOS为水下文化遗产规定的制度似乎并不完整，只有两项载于《公约》

（第十一部分，“区域”）和第303条

18

（第十六部分，

不同部分的规定，即第149条

17

“一般规定”）。而且，这两项规定在概念上存在矛盾。一方面，第149条的基本

假设是，遗产必须为了造福人类予以保存和利用，与遗产有关联的某些国家应享

有优先权。而另一方面，第303条第3款至少在英文文本中可以这样解释，即含

蓄地鼓励掠夺水下文化遗产，特别是在大陆架上发现的遗产。该条款优先考虑“打

捞法和其他海事规则”，照一些英美法系国家的理解，这样一套规定适用“先到先

得”或“自由捕捞”的方式来把水下文化遗产据为己有。这无疑有利于私人商业获

16 《关于获取遗传资源和公正和公平分享其利用所产生惠益的名古屋议定书》，于2010

年10月29日《生物多样性公约》缔约方大会第十届会议通过。“缔约方应考虑有必

要制定一种全球性多边惠益分享机制并考虑这一机制的模式，以便解决公正和公平分

享从跨界的情况下发生或无法准予或获得事先知情同意的利用遗传资源和与遗传资

源相关的传统知识中获得的惠益。遗传资源和与遗传资源相关的传统知识的使用者

通过这一机制所分享的惠益，应该用于支持在全世界保护生物多样性和可持续地利用

其组成部分。”虽然《名古屋议定书》不适用于国家管辖范围以外的区域，但它可能成

为未来适用于这些区域内资源的制度的灵感来源。

17 《联合国海洋法公约》第149条“考古和历史文物”：在“区域”内发现的一切考古和历

史文物，应为全人类的利益予以保存或处置，但应特别顾及来源国，或文化上的发源

国，或历史和考古上的来源国的优先权利。

18 《联合国海洋法公约》第303条“在海洋发现的考古和历史文物”：1. 各国有义务保护

在海洋发现的考古和历史性文物，并应为此目的进行合作。2. 为了控制这种文物的贩

运，沿海国可在适用第33条时推定，未经沿海国许可将这些文物移出该条所指海域

的海床，将造成在其领土或领海内对该条所指法律和规章的违犯。3. 本条任何规定不

影响可辨认的物主的权利、打捞法或其他海事法规则，也不影响关于文化交流的法律

和惯例。4. 本条不妨害关于保护考古和历史性文物在其他国际协定和国际法规则。

10

中华海洋法学评论（

2020

年第

3

期）

19

益，而有损于为公众利益进行研究和展示水下文化遗产的目标。如果是这样，

与水下发现的某些文化遗产有联系的国家可能会被剥夺为防止其历史与文化遗产

遭掠夺的任何权利和措施。

2001年11月2日，教科文组织（联合国教育、科学及文化组织）于巴黎正式

通过了《水下文化遗产保护公约》（Convention on the Protection of Underwater

Cultural Heritage，以下简称“CPUCH”）。该公约以UNCLOS第149条为基础，

其基本目标是防范因UNCLOS第303条第3款产生的自由掠夺制度的风险。它

做出的一般性规定是，缔约国有义务“为全人类之利益保护水下文化遗产”（第

2条第3款）以及“不得对水下文化遗产进行商业开发”（第2条第7款）。尽管

CPUCH制度并没有完全禁止海事法，包括打捞法和打捞物法，但它具有防止适

关于在大陆架上发现的

用这类法则所产生的所有不良影响的实际效果。

20

例如，

水下文化遗产，CPUCH规定了一种程序机制，涉及与遗产有可证实联系的国家

的参与，这些国家必须就如何最好地保护遗产进行磋商。

21

CPUCH已于2009年1月2日生效。CPUCH虽然正式申明UNCLOS不受

22

但实际上却试图对UNCLOS中一个非常有问题的方面进行补救。如果

妨碍，

对遗产的掠夺是UNCLOS制度的结果，那么UNCLOS在这一具体问题上就是错

误的。

23

六、结 论

正如示例所表明的那样，国际海洋法的修改与完善既可以在UNCLOS内

发生，在某些情况下也可以在UNCLOS外发生。后者并不是值得担忧的事。

UNCLOS像任何法律文书一样，都与谈判和通过该公约的时间有关（具体到本公

19　 R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943 (1999), in International Legal Materials, 1999,

p.807. 例如，根据美国第四巡回上诉法院1999年3月24日对R.M.S. Titanic公司诉

Haver案所作的裁决，打捞物法是指“如果一个人在通航水域发现了长期失踪或被遗

弃的沉船，并将其财产化为实际占有或推定占有，那么他就成为财产所有人。”反过来，

打捞法适用于财产所有人已知的情况，该法赋予打捞人对财产的留置权（或对物权）。

20 《水下文化遗产保护公约》第4条“与打捞法和打捞物法的关系”：打捞法和打捞物法

不适用于开发本公约所指的水下文化遗产的活动, 除非它：（a）得到主管当局的批准，

同时（b）完全符合本公约的规定，同时又（c）确保任何打捞出来的水下文化遗产都能

得到最大程度的保护。

21　 该机制以三个步骤的程序（报告、磋商、紧急措施）为基础。

22 《水下文化遗产保护公约》第3条“本公约与《联合国海洋法公约》之间的关系”：本公

约中的任何条款均不得妨碍国际法，包括《联合国海洋法公约》，所赋予各国的权利、

管辖权和义务。本公约应结合国际法，包括《联合国海洋法公约》，加以解释和执行，

不得与之相悖。

23　 令人遗憾的是，有些国家似乎还没有充分认识到CPUCH传达出的合理信息，因为该

条约到2017年8月为止只对57个国家生效。

《联合国海洋法公约》框架内、外（在某些情况下）

国际海洋法的新进展

11

约，相关时间为1973年至1982年之间）。UNCLOS本身作为时代的产物，无法

阻止时间的流逝。国际海洋法经历了一个自然演化和逐渐发展的过程，这一过程

与各国的实践相联系，各国的实践发挥着其对UNCLOS的影响。

翻译：黄宇欣、曲娇、张海英

校对：李长山

12China Oceans Law Review(Vol. 16 No. 3)

The Progressive Development of International

Law of the Sea: Within or (in Certain Cases)

without the UNCLOS

Tullio Scovazzi

*

I.A Commonly Repeated Statement

The resolutions that the United Nations General Assembly yearly adopts on

the subject “Oceans and the Law of the Sea” emphasize that the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 1982, hereinafter “UNCLOS”) is

the legal framework within which all activities in the sea must be carried out. For

instance, a recent resolution reaffirms that the UNCLOS

sets out the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas

must be carried out and is of strategic importance as the basis for national,

regional and global action and cooperation in the marine sector, and that its

integrity needs to be maintained (…).

1

While an analogous assumption is often repeated by States and scholars,

the question may be asked whether it fully corresponds to the truth. There is no

doubt that the UNCLOS is a cornerstone in the process for the codification of

international law. It has been rightly described as a “constitution for oceans”, “a

monumental achievement in the international community”, “the first comprehensive

*Tullio Scovazzi, Professor of International Law, Department of Law, University of Milano-

Bicocca,:*************************.Thisarticleistheauthor’sconference

paper

of the 2nd Sino - European States International Law of the Sea Symposium

(Xiamen). The author would like to express his sincere gratitude to the South China

Sea Institute of Xiamen University for the invitation and to all the experts for their

comments on the author’s presentation.

©THE AUTHOR AND CHINA OCEANS LAW REVIEW

1 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 23 December 2016: Oceans and the law of

the sea, A/RES/71/257.

The Progressive Development of International Law of the Sea:

Within or (in Certain Cases) without the UNCLOS

13

treaty dealing with practically every aspect of the uses and resources of the seas

and the oceans”, as well as an instrument that “has successfully accommodated the

competing interests of all nations”.

2

The UNCLOS has these and other merits that

nobody could deny. However, the assumption that everything that occurs in the seas

must necessarily fall under the scope of the UNCLOS – if this is the idea put forward

in the above mentioned resolutions – is far from being convincing.

A first remark is that there are some evident gaps in the UNCLOS itself. The

States involved in the negotiations for this treaty were not willing or capable to

address and settle a few thorny questions that were deliberately left in the vague. In

this case, the gaps could be filled by resorting to provisions of customary international

law (regulation through customary international law). It may also happen that

some UNCLOS provisions make use of general terms that lack sufficient precision.

Where different understandings of the relevant UNCLOS provisions are in principle

admissible, State practice may be important in making one interpretation prevail over

another (regulation through UNCLOS interpretation).

A second, and even more obvious, remark is that, while it provides a solid legal

regime for many matters, it would be illusory to think that the UNCLOS is the end

of legal regulation in the field of law of the sea. Unexpected problems may arise and

new activities can be developed that require specific rules, including perhaps some

departures from the UNCLOS provisions. In two cases additions and changes with

respect to the original UNCLOS regime have been integrated into the UNCLOS itself

through the adoption of so-called implementation agreements (regulation through

UNCLOS integration). In another case, where the UNCLOS regime was clearly

unsatisfactory – this happens very seldom, but cannot be excluded altogether –, a

new instrument of universal scope has been drafted to avoid the risk of undesirable

consequences (regulation in another context).

II. Regulation through Customary International Law

The most evident gap in the UNCLOS can be found in Article 74, relating to the

delimitation of the exclusive economic zone, and in the analogous Article 83, relating

to the delimitation of the continental shelf:

2

Tommy T. B. Koh, A Constitution for the Oceans, in U.N., The Law of the Sea - Official

Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index, New

York, 1983, p. xxiii.

14China Oceans Law Review(Vol. 16 No. 3)

1. The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with opposite

or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international

law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,

in order to achieve an equitable solution.

2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time,

the States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV [=

Settlement of Disputes].

3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned,

in a spirit of understanding and co-operation, shall make every effort to enter

into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional

period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such

arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation.

4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned,

questions relating to the delimitation of the exclusive zone shall be defined in

accordance with the provisions of that agreement” (Art. 74).

3

The reading of Articles 74 and 83 leaves the impression that, despite the

elaborated content, they do not provide any substantive regime. By resorting to

procedural means, they avoid tackling the main issue at stake. Apart from indicating

the procedures to which the States concerned are bound to resort with the aim to find

a solution, Articles 74 and 83 do not say very much on the question of delimitation.

In particular, para. 1 does not specify what the substantive rules are that become

applicable if the States concerned do not reach an agreement on the delimitation. The

reference to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice does not

provide any clear guidance on how to address the substance of the question,

4

that is

how to draw a line on a map. The indication of the objective of achieving an equitable

solution seems redundant, as any agreement which has been freely negotiated and

3

Arts. 74 & 83 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Art. 83 reproduces

almost completely Art. 74, the only change being “continental shelf” instead of “exclusive

economic zone”.

4

Art. 38 of Statute of the International Court of Justice Statute. The provision specifies the

categories of rules that the International Court of Justice must apply: “(a) international

conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the

contesting States; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d) (...) judicial decisions and

the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means

for the determination of rules of law”.

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15

concluded by the parties embodies by definition an equitable solution. Para. 4, which

provides that, where there is an agreement in force for the States concerned, such

agreement applies, somehow recalls the story of Monsieur de La Palice. Articles

74 and 83 can be understood as a confirmation of the general obligation of the

States concerned to behave in good faith in order to conclude an agreement on the

delimitation. But it is impossible to infer from them any further guidance on how to

reach the solution of the problem.

The vague content of Articles 74 and 83 was due to practical reasons. During the

UNCLOS negotiations, States involved in sensitive issues of maritime delimitation

strongly opposed precise rules which could have played in favour of their opposite

or adjacent neighbouring States. Also States facing manifold issues of delimitation,

depending on the characteristics of the coastlines and the different neighbouring States

concerned, preferred a vague wording which would grant them enough flexibility

to play different games in different fields. It was extremely difficult to force such a

stalemate situation by setting forth clear-cut provisions in the UNCLOS text. Here is

the explanation of the UNCLOS drafter’s choice to leave the very controversial issue

of delimitation unresolved. This was necessary to avoid the opening of a Pandora’s

box which could have precluded the very adoption of the convention or its universal

acceptance.

5

Today the normative gap left in the UNCLOS is being filled by international

decisions, which since 1969

6

have been rendered by the International Court of Justice

or arbitral tribunals. This notable body of international decisions shows the use of a

number of “methods” (such as equidistance, proportionality, reduced effect of islands,

the shifting of the equidistance line, the drawing of a corridor) that, in the light of the

circumstances which were relevant in each specific case, were found by courts to be

appropriate for delimiting maritime coastal zones in order to achieve an equitable

solution. The methods in question have today consolidated into rules of customary

5

Eritrea/Yemen - Sovereignty and Maritime Delimitation in the Red Sea, PCA-CPA, Judgement,

para. 116 (1999). The stalemate of the UNCLOS is so evident that the arbitral court that on 17

December 1999 decided the Eritrea - Yemen Arbitration (Second Stage: Maritime Delimitation)

case made following remark: “In any event there has to be room for differences of opinion

about the interpretation of articles [= Arts. 74 & 83 of the UNCLOS] which, in a last minute

endeavour at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to get agreement on

a very controversial matter, were consciously designed to decide as little as possible. It is clear,

however, that both articles envisage an equitable result” (para. 116 of the award).

6

The first relevant judgment was rendered by the International Court of Justice on 20 February

1969 in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark;

Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands).

16China Oceans Law Review(Vol. 16 No. 3)

international law.

Another gap in the UNCLOS can be found in Paragraph 6 of Article 10. It states

that the UNCLOS provisions on bays do not apply to so-called historic bays. This

exception creates a legal vacuum, as nowhere the UNCLOS specifies what historic

bays are and what other rules apply to them. Some conditions are referred to in

international practice and doctrinal works as the constitutive elements of a historical

title over bays – namely the exercise of State authority, the long-lasting duration of

this exercise, acquiescence by other States and, although less frequently, the presence

of vital interests by the coastal State. But many different views are put forward by the

States concerned as regards the existence of such conditions in specific cases.

7

tion through UNCLOS Interpretation

The instance of straight baselines (Article 7 UNCLOS) shows that sometimes

States practice corresponds to a rather broad interpretation of an UNCLOS provision

that could have a different meaning if understood in a literal manner.

The word “baseline” designates the line from which the territorial sea and the

other coastal zones are measured. A system of straight baselines is an exception to

the rule according to which the normal baseline of the territorial sea is the low water

mark along the coast. Instead, if certain circumstances occur, straight baselines can be

drawn into the sea to connect appropriate points on land. The relevant paragraphs of

Article 7 read as follows:

localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a

fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight

baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline

from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. (...)

drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable

extent from the general direction of the coast, and the sea areas lying within the

lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the

régime of internal waters. (...).

Some redundancy may be noticed in the provision, as a deeply indented coast is

7

Art. 298, para. 1(a)(i), UNCLOS refers to “disputes (…) involving historic bays or titles”.

This implies that historic claims can be made also as regards marine waters different from

bays.

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necessarily cut into, and viceversa. But the idea behind it seems clear. Nature cannot

be remade by changing in a radical way the shape of a State. What is allowed is to

rectify by a geometrical device a manifestly irregular coastline. To simplify without

altering: this is the purpose of the straight baselines exception.

However, the reading of Article 7 leaves a feeling of uncertainty, as the wording

of the provision does not contain sufficient geometrical precision. A number of

questions may be asked in this regard. When can a coastline be considered to be

deeply indented and cut into? What should the ratio be between the length of the

closing line of the indentation and the distance between this line and the most internal

point of the indentation? At what distance from the coast should a fringe of islands be

located to be considered in its immediate vicinity? Should this distance be measured

between the coast and the closest island or the most external one? What should be

the distance between the islands themselves in order to constitute a fringe? Could

fringes located in a direction perpendicular to the coast, and not parallel to it, qualify

for straight baselines? How is it possible to determine whether the drawing of straight

baselines departs to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast?

How is the general direction of the coast itself to be determined?

8

In what cases can

marine areas be considered as sufficiently closely linked to the land domain? No clear

responses are given in Article 7.

All the problems would have been solved if the UNCLOS had established a limit

of maximum length for the single segments of a straight baseline. But this was not

the case and Article 7 was left vague in its content despite some attempts to give it

more precision. To infer maximum length limits could be considered as a distortion

in the interpretation of a provision which should be understood in conformity with its

flexible nature.

Irrespective of Article 7, a practice has developed in the legislation of several

coastal States. It shows that they rely on rather elastic criteria in the determination of

the drawing of their straight baselines systems along coastlines that, while not linear,

do not seem deeply indented or fringed by islands in their immediate vicinity. Despite

8

It is evident that any conclusions in this respect are greatly influenced by the scale of the

map utilized.

18China Oceans Law Review(Vol. 16 No. 3)

a warning by the International Court of Justice,

9

the practice of several States seems

today definitely oriented towards a quite extensive interpretation and application

of the relevant criteria that goes far beyond strict wording of Article 7 UNCLOS.

Protests are in most cases limited to those made by a few countries or by neighbouring

States which could be affected by the effect of a straight baselines system in making a

maritime delimitation. This trend towards an extensive interpretation could lead to a

new reading of Article 7.

IV. Regulation through UNCLOS Integration

A. Two UNCLOS Implementation Agreements

Evident instances of regulation through integration in the UNCLOS itself are the

two UNCLOS implementation agreements which have been adopted so far. In this

case, changes into the UNCLOS regime are effected in a “physiological” manner that

does not entail a rupture in the logic of the UNCLOS system.

In 1994 several provisions were changed in the most innovatory part of the

UNCLOS, that is the part relating to the mineral resources of the seabed beyond the

limits of national jurisdiction, which are subject to the regime of common heritage

of mankind.

10

The changes were made to achieve the universal participation in

the convention, including by the developed States that had not yet become parties

to it. This was done through the conclusion of the Agreement Relating to the

Implementation of Part XI of the UNCLOS, which was annexed to Resolution

48/263, adopted by the General Assembly on 17 August 1994.

In fact, here the politically prudent label of an “implementation agreement” is

nothing more than a euphemism for the word “amendment” which would have been

more correct from the legal point of view. In principle, the provisions of the 1994

Implementation Agreement and those of Part XI of the UNCLOS “shall be interpreted

and applied together as a single instrument” (Article 2 of the Agreement). However,

in the event of any inconsistency between the 1994 Implementation Agreement and

9

Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain),

ICJ, Judgement, para. 212 (2001). In deciding on 16 March 2001 the case between Qatar and

Bahrain on Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions, the International Court of Justice

pointed out that “the method of straight baselines, which is an exception to the normal rules

for the determination of baselines, may only be applied if a number of conditions are met. This

method must be applied restrictively” (para. 212 of the judgment).

10

See infra, para. IV. B.

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Part XI of the UNCLOS, the provisions of the former prevail.

11

The trend to “integrate” in the UNCLOS regime some additional provisions has

occurred also in the field of fisheries. The Agreement for the Implementation of the

Provisions of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 December

1982, Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and

Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, was opened for signature on 4 December 1995. This

treaty has one evident defect – that is the unbearable length of its title – and many

merits. For instance, it includes detailed provisions on the precautionary approach as

applied to fisheries (Article 6 and Annex II), it establishes that a party may authorize

a vessel to use its flag for fishing on the high seas “only where it is able to exercise

effectively its responsibilities in respect of such vessel” (Article 18, para. 2) and, most

notably, it brings an evident, but welcome, exception to the traditional principle of

freedom of the high seas by providing that States which are not willing to comply

with conservation and management measures can be excluded from fishing on the

high seas.

12

Free rider States, that take advantage from the self-restraint measures

agreed by the other States without accepting the consequent burdens, can thus be

excluded from high seas fisheries. All these developments are important additions to

the UNCLOS regime of fisheries.

B. A Possible Third UNCLOS Implementation Agreement

On 19 June 2015, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus

Resolution 69/292, relating to the development of an international legally-binding

instrument under the UNCLOS on the conservation and sustainable use of marine

biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction. A Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) was

established with the mandate to make substantive recommendations to the General

Assembly on the elements of a draft text of such instrument. The negotiations

11

Incidentally, the fact that eighteen States (as in November 2020), which are parties to the

UNCLOS, are not yet parties to the 1994 Implementation Agreement is a persistent matter

of concern and raises almost inextricable questions of law of treaties.

12

Art. 8 of the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982. On the one hand, all States having a

real interest in the fisheries concerned have the right to become members of a sub-regional or

regional fisheries management organization or participants in such an arrangement (Art. 8, para.

3). On the other, only those States which are members of such an organization or participants

in such an arrangement, or which agree to apply the conservation and management measures

established by such an organization or arrangement, have access to the fishery resources to

which those measures apply (Art. 8, para. 4).

20China Oceans Law Review(Vol. 16 No. 3)

address four main topics intended as a “package”, in the sense that none of them

can be separated from the others, namely “marine genetic resources, including

questions on the sharing of benefits”, “measures such as area-based management

tools, including marine protected areas”, “environmental impact assessments” and

“capacity building and transfer of marine technology”.

On 21 July 2017, the PrepCom recommended to the General Assembly to

take a decision, as soon as possible, on the convening of an intergovernmental

conference to consider its recommendations on the elements to be included in the

text of an international legally binding instrument under the UNCLOS. Several

elements generated consensus among most delegations attending the PrepCom

meetings. On other elements there was divergence of views.

Among the main topics, the question of marine genetic resources presents a

number of political and legal challenges that probably make it the most difficult

aspect of the negotiation. Differences persist as regards a number of components

of the future regime, starting from the fundamental choice on whether it should be

based on the principle of freedom of the high seas or on the principle of common

heritage of mankind.

Under Article 136 of the UNCLOS, the “Area”, that is the sea-bed and ocean

floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, and its resources,

are declared to be the common heritage of mankind. This is the main innovatory

aspect of the UNCLOS. The basic elements of the regime of common heritage of

mankind are the prohibition of national appropriation, the destination of the Area for

peaceful purposes, the use of the Area and its resources for the benefit of mankind

as a whole, with particular consideration for the interests and needs of developing

countries, and the establishment of an international organization entitled to act on

behalf of mankind in the exercise of rights over the resources. They can all be found

in Part XI of the UNCLOS.

13

The Area and its resources are the common heritage of

mankind (Article 136). No State can claim or exercise sovereignty over any part of

the Area, nor can any State or natural or juridical person appropriate any part thereof

(Article 137, para. 1). The Area can be used exclusively for peaceful purposes (Article

141). All rights over the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole, on

whose behalf an international organization, that is the International Sea-Bed Authority

13

Although the regime of the Area was modified by the Agreement Relating to the Implemen-

tation of Part XI of the UNCLOS (see supra, para. IV. A), the principle of common heritage of

mankind remains a major source of inspiration for the UNCLOS.

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21

(hereinafter “ISA”), is entitled to act. Activities in the Area are carried out for the

benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States,

whether coastal or land-locked, and taking into particular consideration the interests

and needs of developing States (Article 140, para. 1). The ISBA provides for the

equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from activities in

the Area through an appropriate mechanism (Article 140, para. 2).

However, the prospects coming from the mineral resources in the Area remain

uncertain, as some factors have a negative impact on their future commercial

exploitation. They include the great depths at which deposits occur, the high costs

involved in research and development of mining technology and the fact that, under

current economic conditions, deep seabed mining remains uncompetitive if compared

to land-based mining.

In the meantime, the exploitation of genetic resources found beyond the limits

of national jurisdiction has become a commercially promising activity. The deep

seabed is not a desert, despite extreme conditions of temperature, complete darkness

and high pressure. It is the habitat of diverse forms of life associated with typical

features, such as hydrothermal vents, cold water seeps, seamounts or deep water coral

reefs. In particular, it supports biological communities that present unique genetic

characteristics, including the ability to survive extreme temperatures (thermophiles

and hyperthermofiles), high pressure (barophiles) and other difficult conditions

(extremophiles).

So far, only few States and private entities have at their disposal the financial

means and sophisticated technologies required to reach the deep seabed and take

samples of organisms found there, in order to isolate in laboratories the genetic

materials deriving from them. The result could be the development and patenting of

commercially valuable products.

The legal problems arising from this kind of activities are due to the fact that

neither the UNCLOS, nor the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity provides

any specific regulatory framework for marine genetic resources beyond national

jurisdiction.

In this regard, several States, especially within the group of developing countries,

take the position that the UNCLOS principle of common heritage of mankind applies

also to marine genetic resources and that the mandate of the ISBA should cover also

such resources. Other States, in particular some developed countries, rely on the

principle of freedom of the high seas, which would imply freedom of access to, and

unrestricted exploitation of, genetic resources.

22China Oceans Law Review(Vol. 16 No. 3)

It seems that both the conflicting views move from the frequently repeated

assumption that the UNCLOS is the legal framework for all activities taking place in

marine spaces. However, the UNCLOS cannot work the miracle of regulating those

activities that were not foreseeable in the period when it was being negotiated. At

this time, very little was known about the uses of the genes of marine organisms. The

expressions “genetic resources” and “bioprospecting”

14

do not appear in any of the

UNCLOS provisions.

It is a matter of fact that the term “activities” in the Area is defined in the

UNCLOS as “all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of the resources of the

Area” (Article 1, para. 1) and that the term “resources” of the Area is defined as “all

solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in-situ in the Area at or beneath the sea-

bed, including polymetallic nodules” (Article 133, a). This means that the present

UNCLOS regime of common heritage of mankind does not include the non-mineral

resources of the Area and that the rules envisaged for the exploration and exploitation

of mineral resources cannot be extended to other resources located therein.

However, this does not prevent States from extending the principle of common

heritage of mankind to newly discovered resources not covered by the UNCLOS, if

they wished to do so. The scope of the regime of the Area is already today broader

than it may be believed at first sight. Under the UNCLOS, the legal condition of

the Area as common heritage of mankind has an influence also on the regulation of

activities that, although different from mining activities, are located in this space.

The regime of the Area encompasses subjects which are more or less directly related

to mining activities, such as marine scientific research (see Article 143, para. 1),

the preservation of the marine environment (see Article 145) and the protection of

underwater cultural heritage (see Article 149). As far as the first two subjects are

concerned, it is difficult to draw a clear-cut distinction between what takes place on

the seabed and what in the superjacent waters.

Yet, extension of the principle of common heritage of mankind to the non-

mineral resources of the Area would be a natural evolution within the spirit of the

14

This activity is currently understood as the search for commercially valuable genetic

resources.

The Progressive Development of International Law of the Sea:

Within or (in Certain Cases) without the UNCLOS

23

UNCLOS, that is a treaty based on General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV)

15

and aiming at contributing “to the realization of a just and equitable international

economic order which takes into account the interests and needs of mankind as a

whole and, in particular the special interests and needs of developing countries,

whether coastal or land-locked” (UNCLOS preamble). While a specific regime for

genetic resources is lacking, the aim of sharing the benefits among all States can still

be seen as a basic objective embodied in the spirit of the UNCLOS. Also in the field

of genetic resources, the application of the principle of freedom of the sea, that is

based on a “first-come-first-served” or “freedom-of-fishing-for-resources” approach,

leads to inequitable consequences. New cooperative schemes, including provisions on

access and sharing of benefits, could be envisaged as the basis for the future regime

on marine genetic resources beyond national jurisdiction. This would also be in full

conformity with the principle of fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising

out of the utilization of genetic resources, set forth in Article 1 of the Convention on

Biological Diversity and in Article 10 of its Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources

and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization (Nagoya,

2010).

16

If the future agreement will ever be adopted and enter into force, it could lead

to a major improvement in international law of the sea and a more equitable system

of exploitation of marine resources. Given the difficulties and intricacies of many

among the issues under discussion, the negotiations require a spirit of moderation

and efforts of constructive imagination by the States involved. It is not surprising

15

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 24 October 1970: Declaration of Principles

Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits

of National Jurisdiction, United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/2749(XXV). Under

this resolution, all the resources of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction fall under the

common heritage of mankind regime. The resolution does not make any distinction between

mineral and non-mineral resources.

16

Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of

Benefits Arising from their Utilization, adopted by the Conference of the parties to the

Convention on Biological Diversity at its tenth meeting on 29 October 2010. “Parties

shall consider the need for and the modalities of a global multilateral benefit-sharing

mechanism to address the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the utilization

of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources that occur

in transboundary situations or for which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed

consent. The benefits shared by users of genetic resources and traditional knowledge

associated with genetic resources through this mechanism shall be used to support the

conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components globally”.

While the Nagoya Protocol does not apply to areas beyond national jurisdiction, it could

become a source of inspiration for a future regime applying to resources located in such

areas.

24China Oceans Law Review(Vol. 16 No. 3)

if, in this preliminary stage of the discussions, the best way to address several

crucial questions has not yet materialized. Time will tell about the results of the

forthcoming meetings.

tion in Another Context

To avoid the risk of undesirable consequences, in the case of underwater

cultural heritage where the UNCLOS regime is incomplete or clearly unsatisfactory,

an instrument of universal scope has been adopted in a context different from the

UNCLOS.

It appears that the regime provided by the UNCLOS for underwater cultural

heritage is fragmentary, being composed of only two provisions included in

different parts of the convention, namely Article 149

17

(in Part XI, “The Area”) and

Article 303

18

(in Part XVI, “General provisions”). Moreover, the two provisions

are in a conceptual contradiction one with the other. On the one hand, Article 149

is based on the assumptions that the heritage must be preserved and used for the

benefit of mankind and preferential rights should be granted to certain States that

have a link with it. On the other, para. 3 of Article 303 can be interpreted, at least

in its English text, as an implicit invitation to the looting of the underwater cultural

heritage, especially the heritage found on the continental shelf. It gives priority to

“the law of salvage and other rules of admiralty”, that is a body of rules that are

understood in some common law countries as providing for the application of a

first-come-first-served or freedom-of-fishing approach for the appropriation of the

17

Art. 149 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: “All objects of an

archaeological and historical nature found in the Area shall be preserved or disposed of for

the benefit of mankind as a whole, particular regard being paid to the preferential rights of

the State or country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or the State of historical and

archaeological origin”.

18

Art. 303 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: “1. States have the duty to

protect objects of an archaeological and historical nature found at sea and shall co-operate for

this purpose. 2. In order to control traffic in such objects, the coastal State may, in applying

article 33 [= the contiguous zone], presume that their removal from the sea-bed in the zone

referred to in that article without its approval would result in an infringement within its

territory or territorial sea of the laws and regulations referred to in that article [= customs,

fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations]. 3. Nothing in this article affects the

rights of identifiable owners, the law of salvage and other rules of admiralty, or laws and

practices with respect to cultural exchanges. 4. This article is without prejudice to other

international agreements and rules of international law regarding the protection of objects of an

archaeological and historical nature”.

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Within or (in Certain Cases) without the UNCLOS

25

underwater cultural heritage. This can only serve the interest of private commercial

gain

19

at the detriment of the objective of the study and exhibition of underwater

cultural heritage for public interest. If this is the case, a State which has a cultural

link with certain objects found underwater could be deprived of any means for

preventing the pillage of its historical and cultural heritage.

The Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage

(hereinafter “CPUCH”), adopted in Paris on 2 November 2001 within the

framework of the UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization), builds on the assumptions contained in Article 149 UNCLOS and

basically aims at preventing the risk of a freedom of pillage regime arising from

Article 303, para. 3, UNCLOS. It provides in general that States Parties are bound

to “preserve underwater cultural heritage for the benefit of humanity” (Article 2,

para. 3) and that “underwater cultural heritage shall not be commercially exploited”

(Article 2, para. 7). Although it does not totally ban the law of admiralty, including

law of salvage and law of finds, the CPUCH regime has the practical effect of

preventing all the undesirable effects of the application of this kind of rules.

20

For

instance, as regards the underwater cultural heritage found in the continental shelf,

the CPUCH sets forth a procedural mechanism which involves the participation of

the States having a verifiable link to the heritage, which are bound to consult on on

how best to protect the heritage.

21

The CPUCH has entered into force on 2 January 2009. While formally stating

19

R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943 (1999), in International Legal Materials, 1999,

p. 807. For example, according to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

in the decision rendered on 24 March 1999 in the case R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver (in

International Legal Materials, 1999, p. 807), the law of finds means that “a person who

discovers a shipwreck in navigable waters that has been long lost and abandoned and who

reduces the property to actual or constructive possession becomes the property’s owner”. In

its turn, the law of salvage, which applies where the owner of the property is known, gives

the salvor a lien (or right in rem) over it.

20

Art. 4 of the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: “Any

activity relating to underwater cultural heritage to which this Convention applies shall not

be subject to the law of salvage or law of finds, unless it: (a) is authorized by the competent

authorities, and (b) is in full conformity with this Convention, and (c) ensures that any

recovery of the underwater cultural heritage achieves its maximum protection”.

21

The mechanism is based on a three-step procedure (reporting, consultations, urgent

measures).

26China Oceans Law Review(Vol. 16 No. 3)

that the UNCLOS is not prejudiced,

22

in fact the CPUCH tries to bring a remedy to

a very questionable aspect of the former. If the looting of the heritage is the result

of the UNCLOS regime, it is the UNCLOS that is wrong on this specific matter.

23

VI. Conclusion

As the proposed instances show, changes in international law of the sea can

take place both within and, in certain cases, without the UNCLOS. The latter case

should not be seen as an alarming event. The UNCLOS, as any legal instrument,

is linked to the time when it was negotiated and adopted (the period between 1973

and 1982, in the specific case). Being itself a product of time, the UNCLOS cannot

stop the passing of time. International law of the sea is subject to a process of natural

evolution and progressive development which is linked to States’ practice and can

display its influence also on the UNCLOS.

22

Art. 3 of the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: “Nothing

in this Convention shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under

international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This

Convention shall be interpreted and applied in the context of and in a manner consistent

with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”.

23

Sadly enough, it appears that the sensible message coming from the CPUCH has not yet been

fully appreciated by several States, as this treaty is today (November 2020) in force for only 65

States.